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Abstract
Religion was a recurrent theme in Georg Simmel’s thought. Despite this fact, and despite the cur-
rent rediscovery of Simmel’s ideas, his insights into religion remain relatively neglected. The task 
of integrating Simmel’s legacy into the current study of religion remains a continuing challenge. 
This paper, based on an on-going study of Simmel’s work (involving a close reading of his writings 
in the original version), reﬂ ects on his conceptualisation of the relationship between religion under-
stood as an objective, social and historical phenomenon and subjective religiosity. 
In Simmel’s view, the religious perspective – a “particular spiritual quality” or “attitude of the 
soul”, a way of looking at the world as a whole – constitutes a kind of pre-stage of religion. This 
particular perspective of a religion-like (religioid) character makes up an individual foundation for 
religion, but it can also express itself in other cultural pursuits, like science or art. It only becomes 
religion after it assumes a speciﬁ c form in human interaction. Simmel claims that many human rela-
tions have a religious character; faith, which is regarded as the substance of religion, is ﬁ rst a rela-
tionship between individuals. Out of the subjective faith-process there develops an object for that 
faith: the idea of God, who is “the absolute object of human faith”. For Simmel, the idea of God 
(conceived of as the unity of existence, the coincidentia oppositorum) is constitutive for religion. 
Keywords: Georg Simmel, religion, religiosity, classical theory of religion, genetic explanation of 
religion
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“Religion does not create religiosity but religiosity creates religion”1 – this statement 
condenses Georg Simmel’s view on the relationship between religion and religios-
ity. Despite his eminent position in the history of Western thought, and a current 
rediscovery of Simmel’s sociology2, his work on religion, as Frank J. Lechner noted, 
1  G. Simmel, Religion [in:] Essays on Religion, ed. and transl. by Horst Jürgen Helle, New Haven 
1997, p. 150. 
2  See H.-J. Dahme, On the Current Rediscovery of Georg Simmel’s Sociology – A European Point 
of View [in:] M. Kaern, Georg Simmel and Contemporary Sociology, B.S. Phillips, R.S. Cohen (eds.), 
Dordrecht–Boston–London 1990, p. 13 ff.
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„suffers from relative neglect, especially by comparison with that of Durkheim and 
Weber”3. Nevertheless, religion was a recurrent theme in Simmel’s work. His in-
sights into this phenomenon are not only intriguing, but also particularly important 
for the study of modern religion. The aim of this article is to highlight the theoretical 
concept of religion developed by Simmel. This short presentation is bound to sim-
plify Simmel’s complex argument, but tries to minimise the risk of misrepresenting 
his ideas by remaining close to his texts.
Simmel has been described as a founding father of sociology, a philosopher of 
life, and most commonly as a turn-of-the-century German philosopher of culture. 
Nevertheless, as Siegfried Kracauer put it, he could quite properly also be described 
as a philosopher of the soul, of individualism, or of society4; and, as we may add: 
a philosopher or, even more generally, theorist of religion. Simmelian scholars divide 
his intellectual life into three main periods5. The young Simmel was strongly inﬂ u-
enced by pragmatism and evolutionism and, according to his own words, focused on 
the study of Kant and on epistemological, historical and social research6. The second 
phase was marked by the interest in modern society. In 1900 Simmel published The 
Philosophy of Money (Philosophie des Geldes) – his main work, which, according 
to Hans Blumenberg, ranks among the very few books written after Nietzsche that 
should belong to the Western canon7. During the ﬁ rst decade of the 20 century Sim-
mel was engaged in shaping the foundations of an emerging discipline of sociology. 
At the same time he deepened his interest in a sociological analysis of religion. The 
last stage of his intellectual quest was characterised by the turn to philosophy of life 
(Lebensphilosophie) and to metaphysics. 
Although useful, this periodisation is rather simplistic. We can safely say that 
Simmel pursued all these many and varied interests throughout his life, only with 
shifting emphasis, which contributes to the complexity of his thought. For instance, 
Simmel’s serious academic interest in religion lasted for at least twenty years: from 
1898 – whenhe published the ﬁ rst text devoted explicitly to religion: A Contribution 
to the Sociology of Religion (ZurSoziologie der Religion) – until his death in 1918. 
Religion constituted the main subject of several essays written in this period. There 
is also clear evidence of Simmel’s continued committment to the study of religion in 
many other writings, including his seminal Philosophy of Money. 
In 1906 he published his main work on religion (a revised and enlarged edition ap-
peared in 1912).This relatively small book (especially when compared with his opus 
magnum, The Philosophy of Money) bears the simple title Religion (Die Religion) 
3  F.J. Lechner, Social Differentiation and Modernity [in:] Georg Simmel and Contemporary So-
ciology, p. 169.
4  S. Kracauer, Georg Simmel [in:] idem, The mass ornament. Weimar essays, transl. and ed. by T.Y. 
Levin, Cambridge MA–London 1995, p. 225.
5  See forinstance: W. Jung, Georg Simmel zur Einführung, Hamburg 1990, p. 11 ff. 
6  G. Simmel, Anfang einer unvollendeten Selbstdarstellung [in:] Buch des Dankes an Georg Sim-
mel. Briefe, Erinnerungen, Bibliographie, K. Gassen, M. Landmann (eds.), Berlin 1958, p. 9.
7  H. Blumenberg, Geld oder Leben. Eine metaphorologische Studie zur Konsistenz der Philosophie 
Georg Simmels [in:] Ästhetik und Soziologie um die Jahrhundertwende: Georg Simmel, H. Böhringer,
K. Gründer (eds.), Frankfurt am Main 1976, s. 130. 
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and stands as a testimony to a shift in Simmel’s perspective on religion towards the 
philosophy of life. Although he by no means completely abandoned a sociological 
perspective on religion in favour of a philosophical one, his conceptualisation of re-
ligiosity contained the germ of an idea developed many years later in The View of Life 
(Lebensanschauung). This book, published in 1918, was Simmel’s last work, which 
he himself considered to be his most signiﬁ cant achievement. 
The task of integrating Simmel’s legacy into the current study of religion is a con-
tinuing challenge. One of the reasons for this situation is certainly Simmel’s intellec-
tual style, for which Georg Lucács coined the phrase „sociological impressionism”8. 
In Lewis A. Coser’s beautifully phrased words: “Simmel, the marginal man, the 
stranger, presented his academic peers not with a painstakingly elaborated system but 
with a series of often disorderly insights”9. Some of these insights lead to contradic-
tory conclusions, and if we add the hazard of relying on (not always brilliant) transla-
tions, we realise why his work “remains ill understood and a source of puzzlement”10. 
A reconstruction of Simmel’s notion of religion is not an easy task. The reasons 
for this are twofold. Firstly, over the course of two decades Simmel’s understanding 
of religion evolved from an initially sociological concept into a deﬁ nitely philosophi-
cal one. Secondly, Simmel uses the word “religion” (die Religion) sometimes in the 
stricter, and sometimes in the wider sense. “Religion in the stricter sense” might be 
identiﬁ ed with a colloquial meaning of the word, any historical religion or its “con-
tent” – transcendent beliefs; it is clearly contrasted with the word „religiosity” (die 
Religiösität). „Religion in the wider sense” refers to a phenomenon which does not 
necessarily amount to a historical institution. In this wider sense, the word “religion” 
means a prioriform or “world-form” (in contradistinction to religious content) and 
is used interchangeably with many other expressions, like “a subjective human pro-
cess” “religious state of the soul”, “religious tone”, “religious mood”, “religious tun-
ing”, “religious quality”, and “religious attitude”.
Simmel’s initial notion of religion is based on an equation of God with society. 
In his philosophically informed sociology God constitutes a conceptual equivalent of 
society, deﬁ ned as “a synthesis or the general term for the totality of interactions”11. 
The common features of these two ideas are found in the phenomenon of faith and in 
the concept of unity. 
In A Contribution to the Sociology of Religion and later in his book Religion, 
Simmel stated that many human relations (social conditions or interpersonal relation-
ships) – like the relation of a child to its parent or of a patriot to his country – may 
havea common tone which has to be described as religious. This “religious tone” con-
stitutes a mixture of speciﬁ c feelings: “of unselﬁ sh devotion and eudaimonic desire, 
8  This phrase was later popularised by David Frisby. See: D. Frisby, Sociological Impressionism. 
A Reassessment of Georg Simmel´s Social Theory, London 1981. 
9  L.A. Coser, Georg Simmel’s Style of Work: A Contribution to the Sociology of a Sociologist [in:] 
Georg Simmel: Critical Assesments, D. Frisby (ed.), vol. II, New York 1994, p. 27. 
10  M. Kaern, Introduction One: Simmel as a Puzzling Figure [in:] Georg Simmel and Contemporary 
Sociology, M. Kaern, B.S. Phillips, R.S. Cohen (eds.), p. 1. 
11  D. Frisby, Sociological Impressionism. A Reassessment of Georg Simmel’s Social Theory, London 
1981, p. 96. 
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of humility and exaltation, of sensual concreteness and spiritual abstraction”12. Even 
faith, which is widely considered the essence of religion, is ﬁ rst a relation between 
individuals: 
We illustrate a speciﬁ c psychological reality, hard to deﬁ ne, when we [say that we] “believe in 
someone” – the child in its parents, the subordinate in his superior, the friend in a friend (…). 
The social role of this faith has never been investigated, but this much is certain: without it, 
society would disintegrate. (…) From the subjective faithprocess there develops, conversely, 
an object for that faith13. 
An absolute object of human faith is given in the idea of God14. In other words: 
there are some forms of social relation swhose structure predestines them to be an 
ideal raw material for development of religious life. Simmel characterizes these re-
lations as “semireligious in form” (or as the “religious semi-products”: religiöse-
Halbprodukte; he also uses the term “religioid factors”). If they reach a certain level 
of intensity, they may condense or reﬁ ne themselves into a system of religious ideas, 
and “form religion – that is, the world of the objects of faith”15. 
Another common feature of the idea of God and the idea of society lies in the 
concept of unity. Simmel claimed that the idea of unity originated in the social group. 
It developed from a twofold contrast: ﬁ rst, the hostile demarcation from other groups; 
second, the relation of the group to its individual elements. Synthesis of individuals 
in the form of group unity is often perceived by the individual as some kind of mira-
cle. One might also say that the process of social uniﬁ cation causes a religious reac-
tion16: “The unity of things and interests which ﬁ rst impresses us in the social realm 
ﬁ nds its highest representation (…) in the idea of the divine”17. Simmel suggested 
that God was the name given to the social unit: the interactive processes within the 
group “have taken on their own distinct existence as the god”18.
For Simmel, the essence of the idea of God is represented in the Nicholas of 
Cusa’s phrase: coincidentia oppositorum. In The Philosophy of Money he stated that 
out of this ideathat all conﬂ icts of existence ﬁ nd their unity and equalisation in God 
“there arises the feeling of peace and security”19. Later, in Religion, Simmel thus 
described the idea of God as a tranquilizing force20. It is clear, though, that emotions 
associated with the idea of God can be traced back to the relation of individuals to 
the whole.
12  G. Simmel, A Contribution to the Sociology of Religion [in:] Essays on Religion…, p. 104. 
13  Ibidem, p. 109 f. 
14  G.Simmel, Religion [in:] Essays on Religion…, p. 171. 
15  Ibidem, p. 150. 
16  Ibidem, p. 181. 
17  Idem, A Contribution to the Sociology of Religion…, p. 112. 
18  Idem, Religion…, p. 208. 
19 Idem, The Philosophy of Money, transl. by T. Bottomore, D. Frisby from a ﬁ rst draft by K. Men-
gelberg, 3rd enlarged edition, London 2004, p. 236.
20 G. Simmel, Religion…, p. 168.
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One can easily notice the parallels between Simmel’s theory of social origin of 
religion and that of Émile Durkheim21. As Lechner states: 
Like Durkheim, Simmel offered a kind of sociological projection theory. Religion emerges in 
social relations of special intensity. In his relation with God, the individual repeats and trans-
cends his relation to the collectivity. The unity of the group is expressed in religious terms; the 
deity is the name for that unity. (…) But religion is not mere reﬂ ection or projection (…). The 
social origins of religion do not fully account for its nature and function22. 
According to Simmel, religion“is not a ﬁ nished product, but a vital process which 
each soul must beget for itself, no matter how stable the traditional content may be”23. 
Religion is able to draw a given content into the ﬂ ow of the emotions, which continu-
ously renew it: “In this sense there are really «origins» of religion whose appearance 
and effectiveness occur long after the [historical] «origin» of religion”24.
Here, Simmel contrasts religion understood in terms of content (“religion in the 
stricter sense”) with religion understood in terms of subjective process (“religion in 
the wider sense”) – or religiosity. In the essay Contributions to the Epistemology of 
Religion (Beiträgezur Erkenntnistheorie der Religion, 1902) he clariﬁ ed this distinc-
tion as an opposition between religion (religious content) and religiosity (religious 
form). This formulation is based on general opposition between form and content (or 
form and life).
The dialectic of form and content is considered to be Simmel’s main heuristic 
device. He discussed social and cultural phenomena in terms of “forms” and “con-
tents” with a transient relationship: form becoming content, and vice versa. In the 
course of human history, form and content constantly transform into one another. As 
Horst Jürgen Helle put it, “what appears as form and what as content depends on the 
perspective”25: the same content – for instance, government – appears in different 
forms (democracy or autocracy), and the same speciﬁ c form – for instant, autocracy 
– may shape various contents (like state, family, or church). Also the idea of God may 
become the content of quite different forms: either a pious meditation or an intellec-
tual reﬂ ection. The ﬁ rst is a religious phenomenon; the second is not, even though the 
content here is the idea of God, taken from objectiﬁ ed religion. 
In Simmel’s own words: “neither does the religious state of the soul logically 
require any speciﬁ c content nor does any such content bear within itself the logi-
cal necessity to become religion”26. Religiosity as a fundamental a priori category, 
as one of “great forms” (among others, like science or art) can accept as its content 
the entire wealth of reality. Every such form gathers the fragments of existence into 
21  See: S.G. Meštrović, The coming ﬁ n de siècle: an Application of Durkheim’s sociology to moder-
nity and postmodernism, London 1991, p. 55 ff. 
22  F.J. Lechner, Simmel, Georg [in:] Encycylopedia of Religion and Society, W.H. Swatos, Jr. (ed.), 
http://hirr.hartsem.edu/ency/Simmel.htm [accessed: 20.11.2011].
23  G.Simmel, A Contribution to the Sociology of Religion, p. 119. 
24  Ibidem, p. 119. 
25  H.-J.Helle, Introduction [in:] Essays on Religion…, p. XIII. 
26  G. Simmel, Contributions to the Epistemology of Religion [in:] Essays on Religion…, p. 125. 
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a uniﬁ ed totality. None of them can be privileged over any other; and none is ever 
able to substitute for an other. 
Seen as a “great form”, religiosity – in its pure essence – is a way of life, or life 
process, of the religious person. When we are in a religious mood, we experience 
all possible spheres of life as religious. Then, from this general religious mood of 
life, the process of religion acquires a physical, objective form. Religious attitude 
(especially toward the natural world, toward fate and toward other people) “creates” 
the ﬁ nished product of religion, in which the religious quality has acquired concrete 
shape and content. Therefore Simmel concludes: religion does not create religiosity, 
but religiosity creates religion. 
We can thus agree with Phillip Hammond, who stresses that “Simmel’s notion of 
religion is one of sensitivity to or capacity for religion”27. Simmel himself realised 
that his concept liberates religious feeling from exclusive liaison with transcendent 
objects: “There are an inﬁ nite number of affective relationships to some very earthly 
objects, animate or inanimate, that one can designate only as religious”28 (such as the 
response of the patriot to his country, or the response of a person of aesthetic tempera-
ment to that which is beautiful to look at). 
Religiosity – as a “particular spiritual quality” or “attitude of the soul”, a way of 
looking at the world as a whole – constitutes a kind of pre-stage of religion. This par-
ticular perspective of religion-like (religioid) character prepares an individual foun-
dation for religion, but it can also express itself in other cultural pursuits (like science 
or art). Religiosity becomes religion when it assumes a speciﬁ c form in human in-
teraction. Still not every product of a religious attitude can be termed “religion”. We 
should not forget that for Simmel the idea of God remains constitutive for religion in 
the stricter sense. His observation concerning the modern transformations of the idea 
of God is worth noting in this context. In The Personality of God (Die Persönlichkeit 
Gottes, 1911) he claimed that “the concept of God has passed through so much het-
erogenous historical content and so many possibilities of interpretation that all that 
remains is a feeling that cannot be ﬁ xed in any precise form”29.
In one of his last texts – The Conﬂ ict of Modern Culture (Der Konﬂ ikt der mod-
erner Kultur, 1918) he noticed that the eternal struggle between life and form has 
entered a new stage: it is no longer a struggle of a new form against an old, lifeless 
one, „but the struggle against form itself, against the very principle of form”. As 
a consequence, „the ﬁ xed content of religious beliefs tends to dissolve into religious 
life” – understood as a tuning of the inner process of life from which the content of 
belief originally developed30. 
This concept of religiosity has profound implications for the analysis of religious 
transformations in late modernity. Ivan Varga claims that Simmel’s understanding 
of religiosity as a functional quality which “entirely determines some individuals 
27  P. Hammond, Foreword [in:] Essays on Religion…, p. VII. 
28  G. Simmel, Contributions to the Epistemology of Religion… p. 125. 
29  Idem, The Personality of God [in:] Essays on Religion…, p. 45. 
30  Idem, The Conﬂ ict of Modern Culture [in:] Essays on Religion…, p. 21.
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and exists only in rudimentary form in others”31 has a particular relevance for un-
derstanding of contemporary spirituality32. Deena and Michael Weinstein not only 
consider the Simmelian theorem of “liberation of religiosity from religion” (as they 
call it) to be a “heroic project” of „radical reorientation of the religious impulse from 
transcendentalized objects to the depths of life”33. They see it also as a variation of 
the death-of-God-story. I think we may agree with them. Nevertheless, Simmel was 
not a conservative, but rather a countercultural thinker, as Ralph M. Leck suggests34. 
For all we know, he was not nostalgic about the petriﬁ ed contents of Judeo-Christian 
religion. Already in The Problem of Religion Today (Das Problem der religiösen 
Lage, 1911) he suggested that the melting of religious content poses a problem only 
for non-religious or inadequately religious people, for whom “religious dogma is the 
only possible way of leading some kind of religious existence”. In contrast to them, 
a truly religious person simply cannot lose religion: 
I am sure that the inner spiritual processes of people who can be considered at all religious can 
occur only as religious in the ﬁ rst place, just as the movements of a graceful person are graceful 
in themselves (…). A religious person is never left with nothing, for he has a fullness of being35.
31  Idem, Fundamental Religious Ideas and Modern Science: An Inquiry [in:] Essays on Religion…, 
p. 5. 
32  I. Varga, Georg Simmel: Religion and Spirituality [in:] A Sociology of Spirituality, K. Flanagan, 
P.C. Jupp (eds.), Aldershot 2007, p. 151.
33  D. Weinstein, M.A. Weinstein, The Liberation of Religiosity from Religion [in:] Georg Simmel 
between Modernity and Postmodernity, F. Dörr-Backes, L. Nieder (eds.), Würzburg 1995, p. 137 f. 
34  Ralph M. Leck, who sees Simmel as a “post-Christian existential philosopher”, stresses that he 
“was a modernist, not a romantic antimodernist”. See: R.M. Leck, Georg Simmel and Avant-Garde So-
ciology: The Birth of Modernity 1880–1920, New York 2000, p. 18 and 20. 
35  G. Simmel, The Problem of Religion Today [in:] Essays on Religion…, p. 14 ff. 
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